Opinion article
By Tomáš Iliev
The war in Ukraine is about to come to its fourth year. It has placed European security at risk and forced Ukraine to fight for its survival and territorial sovereignty. The end of the conflict seems improbable for now. However, the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska, where Russia’s president suggested a new peace plan., took place lately. At the meeting, the Russian president suggested a new peace plan, which requires Ukraine to give up the rest of the Donbas territory, halt efforts and ambitions to join NATO, become neutral and not allow Western troops into the country. In exchange, Russia would keep some of the territory of the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. While Moscow believes that these claims are the start of a peace agreement that could bring peace, Kyiv and its Western partners view this as a plan to weaken Ukraine and as a means for Moscow to keep influence over Ukraine.
Despite the Russian push in the initial month os the aggression against Ukraine, Kyiv was able to react and push back against Russia’s initial assault. Crucially, by the end of 2022, Ukraine had retaken the Kharkiv region and half of the Kherson region. Ukrainian successes created an expectation that further breakouts would follow. However, neither side of the conflict was able to make a significant push by mid-2023. The war became static, with Russian defences and Ukraine’s comparative lack of resources creating unfovarobale sircumstances for any breakthrough. The situation also continued, as in 2024-25, Russia launched new offensives in the north east, like an assault on Sumy, but these stalled because of Ukraine’s ability to stand ground and protect its territory. However, various issues have appeared on the Ukrainian side. For example, Ukraine’s army suffered a shortage of soldiers, devastation of their infrastructure, and an energy crisis caused by Russian drone and long-range rocket attacks. Even with these challenges, Ukraine maintained control of most of its territory outside the Donbas, which Russia mostly occupies (Russia occupies nearly the whole Luhansk region and three-quarters of the Donetsk region).
Ukraine’s resilience was not simply military but social as well. Millions of civilians endured barrages of missile fire, forced displacement, and economic hardship. Also, opinion polls have repeatedly shown that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian society opposed conceding territory to Russia. The conflict had become existential for the state, but also for Ukrainian identity per se. What is of crucial importance is that the idea of neutrality, once seriously considered before 2014, had evaporated due to Russia’s repeated aggression. This departure from neutrality is not founded merely on security needs but on gained memory. For Ukraine, neutrality in the 1990s was incapable of stopping Russia’s meddling and economic pressure, energy blackmail, and other clandestine activities. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 made sure there were no illusions left about the futility of neutrality. The invasion in 2022 made sure that this lesson became a policy, and joining the Euro-Atlantic community is a matter of survival for Ukraine.
In this context, international diplomacy once again gained momentum. Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 opened up a fresh negotiating channel. Trump called himself the politician who would “end the war quickly”, and Europe did not want to commit to any quick deal that would jeopardise Ukraine’s sovereignty. This situation laid the ground for Trump’s meeting with Putin at the Alaska summit in August 2025. Once a Russian colony purchased by America in 1867, Alaska represented a deep historical importance. For Trump, inviting Putin to such a historically crucial place was a moment to debut his personal diplomacy. The summit was held behind closed doors, but there have been enough leaks to reconstruct its broad outline. Trump was stressing the need for a quick resolution of the conflict, as he is seeking to be recognised as a deal-maker who could do what Biden and the leaders of Europe had failed to achieve. Putin seized the moment to present his terms, cloaked as a compromise but in reality designed to solidify Russia’s military gains. While no agreement was signed, Putin offered his vision of how the war would end. Trump, being Trump, called it a “reasonable proposal worth considering”, but did not fully agree to it. The leaders of Europe, especially in Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw, responded with anxiety, warning that premature concessions would encourage aggression and undermine the sovereignty of Ukraine.
As per leaked information from American and European sources, the proposal by Putin has four key points. First, Ukraine will formally give up its control over the remaining regions of Donetsk and Luhansk which it possesses at present in recognition of Russian sovereignty over the entire Donbas region. Second, Ukraine will give up NATO as an ally in preference for a neutral stance over long term. Further, it will not allow Western bases or troops within its borders while permitting only non-lethal training and humanitarian assistance from outside powers. In return, Russia will end its aggression and retreat from some areas in the regions of Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk, thus ensuring a frozen conflict along its newly defined frontiers. Ostensibly, this is a peace deal, but in reality, it is much more.
Donbas is not merely a territory; it is Ukraine’s quest for self-determination. To lose it would mean confirming Russia’s occupation and the Kremlin’s use of force in manipulating borders. It would set a precedent that would invite yet more aggression, not only in Ukraine but throughout Europe. Donbas itself contains vital industrial resources, energy grids, and transit pipelines, and so is of economic value. For Ukraine, to surrender would be not only a moral failure but also a strategic one. The historical value of Donbas matters as well. Since 2014, when Russia first ignited the separatist uprisings in Donetsk and Luhansk, these territories have been contested not simply on a battlefield but on an identity front. To abandon Donbas would, for Ukrainians, be to leave their fellow citizens to the authoritarian influence of Moscow. The implications are drawn further, if Donbas is deserted, why shouldn’t Moscow demand Kharkiv or Odesa some years later?
Russia’s demand that Ukraine abandon the offer of NATO membership attacks the heart of Kyiv’s security policy. Since 2014, Ukraine has been moving towards Euro-Atlantic integration because neutrality left it susceptible to Russian blackmail. Without NATO protection or even binding security guarantees from Western countries, Ukraine would forever be in the shadow of having to endure repeated invasion once again. As Ukrainian officials argue, neutrality is no armour; it is an open door to aggression. Additionally, the NATO membership pledge in the constitution represents a national consensus established after 2014. Polls show Ukrainians’ backing for NATO has never been stronger. Withdrawal at this stage would damage not just national security but also go against popular will. Preventing Western deployment would also further isolate Ukraine from a military standpoint. While NATO membership remains in the wings for now, the mere presence of Western advisers, trainers, and even rotational forces sends a deterrent signal. Cutting that option out would compel Ukraine to be dependent on its own stretched resources alone, precisely what Moscow desires. Even if Ukraine were to agree on sanctions, one can’t guarantee that Russia would keep its word. Moscow has always been a promise-breaker from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, where Ukraine’s sovereignty was guaranteed in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons, to the Minsk accords, which failed to end the war in Donbas. Counting on Russia to maintain a territorial freeze would be foolish geopolitics.
Most capital cities in Europe recognise that the fate of Ukraine is tied to that of their own. If Russia succeeds in asserting its will by violence, the entire post-Cold War international system is undermined. Poland and the Baltic republics, already wary of Moscow, argue that appeasement would give the Kremlin licence to challenge NATO across the board. For France and Germany, the situation is more critical, as they research how to balance calls for peace and the reality that a bad deal would make the situation even more unstable. The EU also faces domestic pressures. With rising economic costs of supporting Ukraine and populist movements inquiring into burden-sharing, there is a rising temptation to balance a flawed peace deal. But others, such as Estonia, warn that concessions to Putin’s threats would only purchase fleeting peace at the price of long-term security. The Trump administration remains uncertain. While Trump boasts about being able to “end the war”, his reluctance to pledge American resources leads Europeans to question. Trump reportedly is ready to settle for a European-led security guarantee arrangement, in which the U.S. would contribute only limited air power. This creates opportunities and risks alike – while Europe could take on more responsibility for securing Ukraine, the absence of a firm American commitment reduces deterrence. There are heated arguments in the U.S. There are politicians who believe that leaving Ukraine will serve Moscow as a triumph and will harm American credibility globally. On the other hand, there are those who think that unlimited support will sap resources needed elsewhere. This makes it difficult for Kiev to get sustained support from the West.
For Kyiv, the arithmetic is dire. Bending to Putin’s terms would end the war in the short term but at the cost of sovereignty, deterrence, and long-term security. Declining them means continuing to fight, with all the human and economic sacrifices. However, most Ukrainians, hardened by decades of resistance, are ready to take the second step. As President Volodymyr Zelensky has reiterated, no peace can be there at the cost of national dismemberment. The final flaw in Putin’s offer is that Russia’s appetite would be satisfied through territory. History has taught us otherwise. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea in 2014, and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 illustrate a stark pattern – territorial forays are not destinations but stepping stones. Sacrificing Donbas would not end Russia’s ambition to dominate Ukraine. It would only whet it. With Donbas in its pocket, Moscow can retreat, rearm, and prepare to make another push, maybe on Kyiv itself. And besides, the logic of deterrence holds – a rewarded Russia for aggression is a rewarded Russia for further aggression. Only credible security guarantees, backed by NATO and Western capitals, can ensure Ukraine’s long-term survival.
Apart from geopolitical concerns, there is also the human cost of life. There are millions of Ukrainians displaced both inside and outside the country. Mariupol and Bakhmut are in ruins, their citizens scattered. For those who remain under occupation, the prospect of Russian rule for eternity is detestable. Stories of domination, deportations, and forced assimilation emerge sporadically from occupied areas. Submission to Putin’s demands would condemn millions of Ukrainians to such a life. Economically, Ukraine faces a daunting task of recovery. The EU has pledged billions to the budget shortfall in 2026, but reconstruction will run hundreds of billions more. Conceding Donbas would not only lose its valuable industrial capacity, but also shatter investor confidence that Ukraine is a worthwhile long-term alternative. A frozen war would discourage international firms from investing in rebuilding. The economic and humanitarian considerations merely add weight to the strategic argument – concessions do not mean stability, but gaining vulnerability.
Another typically overlooked element of Putin’s proposal is the domestic political price in Ukraine. Any Ukrainian politician who would sign away Donbas or abandon all considerations of NATO membership would face gigantic widespread outrage and risk political collapse. The Ukrainian people have become increasingly politically unified on the idea of sovereignty and integration into Europe since 2022. Concessions would not only shatter domestic consensus but also risk galvanising pro-Russian elements who still exist on the margins. Kremlin policy has always relied not only on outside use of force but also on destabilisation from within. By demanding neutrality and restrictions on alliances, Putin wishes to destroy Ukraine both from within and without.
Diplomatically, the Alaska summit helped to emphasise the global stakes in the war. China, while officially neutral, watched closely. Beijing has an interest in Russian clashes with the West, but also an interest in preventing uncontrolled destabilisation. For Beijing, a frozen conflict is the best option, as it keeps U.S. and European resources tied down while maintaining Russia as an ally. Even China, though, will not fully buy Putin’s maximalist conditions, lest China face international pushback. Other states, from India to Turkey, are involved in this game because of their own interests, usually standing between Moscow and the West. For the countries of the developing world, Ukraine is not only a conflict but a principle: whether the smaller states would preserve their sovereignty or whether major powers could violate borders with armed conflict. Putin’s Alaska scheme is no peace proposal; it is a policy of coercion in diplomatic attire. It aims to enshrine Russia’s conquests, strip Ukraine of its security relations, and entangle the country in a position of weakness. A peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia would only serve as a brief respite before the next fight broke out. It is important that policymakers in the West avoid becoming distracted by quick fixes. For peace to be achieved, it must not come at the expense of security and justice. Ukraine needs continued backing, both military, economic, and diplomatic, so that it can cope with the intimidation coming from Russia. The Alaska summit demonstrated just how much is at stake. It is not a matter of Ukraine’s border, but of the future of the European order. To yield now would be to send the message that force pays. To resist is to affirm the principle that borders cannot be altered through violence. For Ukraine, for Europe, and for the integrity of the West, the choice must be clear.